Human Ethology Newsletter

Editor : Frans X. Plooij
Paedological Institute of the City of Amsterdam
IJsbaanpad 9, 1076 CV Amsterdam, The Netherlands (20) 6643321 or (2963) 4197

VOLUME 5, ISSUE 12 ISSN 0739-2036 DECEMBER, 1989

Published by the International Society for Human Ethology

Contents

Newsletter Submissions

Anything which might be of interest to ISHE members is welcome: society matters, suggestions for Forum topics, Growing Points, Mini Communications, Current literature and films, and material for the Bulletin Board such as announcements of meetings, sabbatical oportunities, employment opportunities, etc., should be sent to the Editor.

Suggestions for books to review, or reviews, should be sent to the nearest Book Review Editor dealing with the language concerned. A list of the book review editors is printed in the collumn inside the backpage.

Submissions in any legible format are acceptable as long as these are in English. Floppy disks containing Wordperfect files produced on an IBM-PC (compatible), or ASCII files can be processed as well and are in fact preferred, because they lower the production costs.

Submission deadlines are as follows: the material should have reached the editor in Amsterdam before February 15, May 15, August 15, or November 15 for inclusion in the next issue of March, June, September, or December, respectively.

Publishing Policy

No material in the Newsletter is selected by critical peer review and thus material is printed only to foster free and creative exchange of (even outrageous) ideas between researchers. The fact that material appears in the Newsletter never implies the thruth of those ideas, ISHE's support of them, nor any support for any policy implications that one might be able to draw from them.

FORUM

The publications of J. Philippe Rushton on racial differences caused a great stir in the North-American media last year and remained not unnoticed in Europe. Therefore a symposium was organized at the 10th International Congress of Human Ethology in Edinburgh this year, with opponents and proponents expressing their views. Since most people felt that the opportunity to discuss matters publicly and openly with Dr. Rushton was limited, the forum discussion is continued in the newsletter. References to Rushton's primary publications can be found in the reference lists following the various discussions.

The Editor.

Intellectual Freedom and Responsibility

by: I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Forschungsstelle für Humanethologie in der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Von-der-Tann-Strasse 3-5, D-8138 Andechs, Fed. Rep. of Germany.

What do we mean when we speak of freedom? In fact we can mean quite different things. Some see freedom in terms of the opposition between what is determined and what is not determined. This is evidently nonsense, as has been thoroughly discussed by Hassenstein (1979), amongst others. Subjectively we feel free to choose, but in fact choice takes place on the basis of experience, be it phylogenetic or individual, and the values deriving from it. Without such values, there would be no such things as responsibility.

But there also exists a freedom for which people fight — that is the freedom to express one's opinion. This freedom is granted to us, if we are lucky, by our society. It is a social freedom and we aptly speak of liberty when we are free to express ourselves. However, people who express themselves freely may do so by presenting very dogmatic views, stemming from the experience of rigid ideological indoctrination. Such people have freedom of speech in as far as they are allowed to openly express their thoughts. Their statements may, however, lack intellectual freedom, as defined by the openness to consider the points of view of others and to be able to revise their own opinions accordingly.

Intellectual freedom cannot be granted by society. It is a freedom that everyone has to struggle to obtain within themselves through self-discipline and training. In order to achieve intellectual freedom, we must be able to detach our rational self

from our emotional self, and it is our emotional self that is normally triggered when we become aroused by anger, love or ideological values. Only when we succeed in detaching emotion from thought, have we created a situation without tension that allows us to reconsider and be flexible in our opinions.

Interestingly, our ability to detach thought and action from emotion has roots in our mammalian heritage. I became aware of this during my studies of the ontogeny of play behaviour. In 1949 I raised a baby badger. Once he was weaned, he lived freely under my barrack in the Viennese forest. In the evening he sought my company as a playmate. He would attack me and then retreat in mock fight. If an object caught his attention, he would catch and shake the object in mock hunting. He would freely shift to and fro from fight, to flight to hunting behaviors. Evidently he was not aroused by emotions of aggression or fear during these play sessions. It was then that I realized that higher mammals are able to decouple their emotions from behaviour patterns. They are thus able to experiment freely with their motor abilities as well as their environment, allowing them to explore, experiment and learn.

I later read in Wolfgang Köhler's account of his chimpanzee studies of how Sultan discovered how to put two sticks together to get a banana lying outside his cage. When first confronted with the task, he tried to use two short sticks, first one and then the other, in rapid succession, but of course in vain. Finally he threw a temper tantrum and turned his back on the scene. When his temper had cooled, he began to play with the sticks and then accidentally discovered how to put them together to form one long stick. Once he had done this, he remembered his old objective and got the banana that was now within reach of his longer stick.

Let us then stay cool when discussing subjects that are likely to arouse us emotionally, for we are going to discuss the hypothesis of racial differences in reproductive behaviour. I say cool, but not unengaged.

When gathering scientists from different branches of our discipline, we might ask the question, "What do we as scientists have in common?" For one thing, hopefully we have a concern for other people. We must remember though that our loyalties are graded. First come our family and kin, then closer related people of the same ethnic group and so on. Sociobiologists like Van der Berghe have discussed the phenomenon of ethnocentrism in the light of evolutionary theory and now we understand it at least in principle. Since it is genetic survival through survival of offspring which counts in evolution, ethnocentrism was a means of promoting the survival of our own genes. But from this it does not follow that we need to continue the ruthless ethnocentrism that has tainted most of human history up until now. We may not be able to love five billion people who are unknown to us, but we have every reason to foster a spirit of mutual tolerance and understanding since, as Hans Hass (1981) has expressed it: "Everything responsible for our human existence is due to a anonymous multitude of others who lived before us and whose achievements have been bestowed upon us as gifts."

We have created a concept of mankind in an attempt to foster a feeling of common heritage and thus to overcome the antagonism that leads to war. And since, amongst many other universally found behaviours, we share affiliative emotions, we are prepared to continue our struggle for survival in cooperative efforts. We have, however, to find ways to achieve this by respecting and appreciating cultural and racial diversity which requires social contracts as precautions against domination. To do this we need as full as possible an understanding of human behaviour. So far, research in human ethology has concentrated on elucidating behaviors that are universally found in man. The result has been the discovery of an immense repertoire of shared behaviors. However, few human ethologists have looked for biologically based differences. If no such differences are found — fine — that makes it easier to grasp a feeling of common heritage. However, if differences do exist, only through an understanding of these can we attain mutual respect and peaceful co-existence. Differences, after all, have provided the pool of diversity essential to our evolution and, in humans, can either be used as the basis for antagonism or complementarity.

r/K Theory and Human Differences

by: Jay R. Feierman, Presbyterian Behavioral Medicine Center, 1325 Wyoming Blvd., N.E., Albuquerque, NM 87112, USA.

The issue that concerns me has little to do with the appropriateness of r/K theory to explain human differences, although I believe it is presumptuous to assume that the distribution of highly context dependent behavioral variables necessarily reflects the distribution of genotypes. But I do not want to argue that issue here. Rather, what concerns me most are the sociopolitical implications of the questions. Where is this leading us? And who is "us", white man?

If the question is simply the predictive potency of r/K theory, I believe that the welfare of the individuals who are being hurt by the supposed answers is more important than the question. Science is not done in a sociopolitical vacuum.

There is also an issue of "informed consent" in any human research where there is potential for harm to identified individuals. It is fairly clear what group is being harmed and, parenthetically, what group is benefitting by the press coverage of this issue. Scientists are not immune from sociopolitical responsibility.

The sociopolitical implications of an entire "race" of humans being of "low intelligence," "low altruism" and "low law abidingness" are so clear. I therefore believe that an organized scientific body needs to study the validity of the evidence and then issue a statement or a report. Unfortunately, academic debates in meetings and in newsletters don't get the same type of international press coverage as "racially inflammatory statements" by otherwise distinguished Professors.

The embers of another era are still smoldering. I suppose that some of us are more sensitive to this issue than others.

Human Ethology: r/K selection and the "New Racism"

by: Karl Grammer and Maximilian Stöckl, Forschungsstelle für Humanethologie in der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, D-8138 Andechs, FRG.

"Population differences exist in personality and sexual behaviour such that, in terms of restraint, Orientals>Whites>Blacks." Furthermore, *"this ordering is predicted from an evolutionary theory of r/K reproductive strategies in which a tradeoff occurs between gamete production and parental care."* These statements were made by J.P. Rushton in his article *"Race differences in sexual behaviour: Testing an evolutionary*

hypothesis" (Rushton, 1987, p. 529), and they illustrate the subject of a paper presented at the 10th International Congress of Human Ethology. The evolution-based explanation for these differences, according to Rushton, is the following one: Blacks are adapted to an unpredictable tropical environment; whites and orientals are adapted to a northern climate that is predictable over the long term (Rushton, 1988); the adaption is supposed to have caused a variety of genetic differences among the races.

In fact, this is a simple and appealing working hypothesis, but it is not a theory. It is a simple, testable, explanatory model, which, Rushton thinks, explains a wide variety of quite different variables: physical features, reproductive behaviour, sexual behaviour, criminal behaviour, and differences in intelligence and personality.

This hypothesis, or, more accurately, the data that have been cited to support it, has garnered considerable scientific and popular attention. Not because of the reported genetic differences among the races, however—there surely are such differences. The reason for the attention is that rank ordering the data the way Rushton does implies to the average person that differences in quality exist among the three populations. Rank ordering races places Rushton near Gobineau,[1] who suggested in his *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (originally published in 1853; first German translation 1898, next edition 1934, last edition 1940; Stuttgart: Fr.Frommanns) that there are genetically determined "traits of superiority" between races. Thus, the implied qualitative differences among the races take on a political dimension, because it is possible to use such differences as justification for nearly every type of racial discrimination. This political potential inherent in Rushton's ideas makes necessary the discussing of these ideas from two different perspectives: the scientific one and the political one. Rushton himself seems to be well aware of this problem when he writes: *"However, fearfulness about injustice resulting from the overgeneralization of differences in group means to particular individuals should not keep us from vigorous research. The exploration of genetic variance within the human species, and the analysis of the causes of this variance, are of crucial importance to understanding man"* (Rushton, 1988, p. 1021).

This letter is not guided by fearfulness. Its main concern is "vigorous research" and possible implications resulting from this research.

From a scientific perspective, Rushton's attempt to prove his hypothesis suffers from numerous methodological flaws. Although each point Rushton makes (see, for instance, Rushton, 1988) is elaborated in great detail, no actual data on variation are presented, except for penis length and penis diameter (indeed it is difficult to understand why penis length, brain size, and intelligence should be related to differences in reproductive strategies). In addition, all data that are presented come from other authors. Thus, Rushton's argumentation relies on hypotheses on means — and thus becomes a metahypothesis: it's a hypothesis about hypotheses on racial variations.

When we have a closer look at the evidence that is provided, we see that the argument becomes even weaker. As soon as the argumentation leaves the arena of physical anthropology and moves on to psychology and sociology, possible intervening variables are almost completely neglected. Again Rushton tries to solve this problem by citing other authors, without presenting his own data: *"Some of the observations can be explained in purely environmental terms. Chinese and Japanese, for example, typically come from traditional backgrounds where there are strong socializing pressures to conform, and restraint is generally valued. . . . . Black males apparently learn early that assertive sexuality and sexual prowess are means of gaining status . . . ."* (Rushton, 1987, p. 543) or *"As we have implied, personality, sexuality, and culture are likely to interact in profound ways"* (p. 546).

Instead of discussing these arguments thoroughly, Rushton, in his 1988 article, presents an impressive mass of counterevidence. This type of evidence then leads him to the conclusion: *"That across populations brain size negatively correlates* [our emphasis] *with gamete production, and both covary with a suite of other attributes, provides compelling support for the r/K perspective"* (Rushton, 1988, p. 545). Sorry, but we missed the correlation coefficient. This type of argumentation would imply empirical relations, which have not been shown. Doesn't Rushton know about the highly significant positive correlation between the disappearance of the white stork (which, in some fairy tales, is said to bring German babies) and the decrease of the birth rate in Germany? Correlations (although empirically demonstrated) do not necessarily reflect causal relationships.

Many of the racial differences that are evident through Rushton's literature review also could be explained in relation to differences in socioeconomic status (SES) or differences in culturally transmitted values of the populations. Remember that, with a few exceptions, most of the data come from one society (mainly the United States), where the populations that are being considered live under completely different socioeconomic conditions from one another. The almost complete neglect of possible intervening variables in Rushton's presentation of the literature is a serious mistake. In fact, we suggest the hypothesis that a similarity in socioeconomic conditions reduces (in most of the evidence presented) more statistical variance than a similarity in race does. Again, Rushton knows this: *"We do know that considerable variability exists within each major group, as well as within numerous subdivisions"* (p. 547). If variance exists, it should be presented.

Another astonishing point is that only large sample sizes are presented. Astonishment turns into surprise when we find only positive evidence — all evidence that is presented appears to be unquestioned "scientific fact." For the average reader, who may not be familiar with the primary sources, it is impossible to evaluate the vast amount of indirect evidence Rushton presents. An average reader (even with a scientific background) is not able to distinguish between facts and factoids.[2] This is the major problem. Rushton himself acknowledges: *"While many studies finding an absence of differences have necessarily been omitted, I am unaware of any major study demonstrating results opposite to those reported here"* (Rushton, 1988, p. 1017). So, another question arises: What are *"major studies"*?

1 Gobineau in his theories mainly used arguments on a cultural and historical level, but he hypothesized that "blood" might play a role. In the beginning of the 20th century, his pupils introduced modern biological and genetic arguments into the theory.

2 Norman Mailer created the term "factoids" for "facts" that exist only through their appearance in printed media. (N. Mailer [1973]: *Marilyn*, Grosset & Dunlap, New York.)

The causal interpretation of a nonexistent correlation coefficient is a venial mistake — together with the combining of data for "litter size" and for physical, psychological, and sociological traits taken from **different sources**, it is a serious error. This proof proves practically nothing. Scientific standards nowadays demand that the same individuals have to show all differences at the same time.

The only way to get around these methodological problems is by the rigorous presentation of data, where the source of the data, the sample sizes, and the variances all are presented in tabular form. Only in this way can the reader get an impression of the weight of the arguments.

There is only one way (and **only one**) to prove the hypothesis: by the presenting of empirical data. Such a presentation means a comparison of mongoloid, caucasoid, and negroid populations who live under different environmental conditions but who have the same socioeconomic background. This is a simple 3 races by 3 environmental conditions design, controlled for socioeconomic status. This proof, of course, is the responsibility of Rushton.

From the perspective of science, the r/K theory applied to human races would be much sounder if it were reformulated back to its point of origin: humans, although genetically different, all have the potential of reacting to different environments (climatic, SES, or whatever) with different reproductive strategies. By using the r/K theory taken from behavioural ecology to explain the data Rushton presents, we might be able to explain the evolutionary success of the species Homo sapiens without prematurely concluding the mechanisms.

Despite the above issues Rushton's critics would have been much more moderate if the statements had not carried such serious political implications. H.P. Eysenck, in his talk at the 10th International Congress of Human Ethology, drew parallels between Rushton, Einstein, and Galileo Galilei. Eysenck stated that everybody, including Galileo and Rushton, should have the right to express his or her scientific ideas. This notion is basically correct. On the other hand, Eysenck assumes that Einstein did not know how his findings would be used for the construction of the atomic bomb and believes that Einstein was, therefore, not responsible for the "misuse" of his ideas and that this premise also applies to Rushton. This notion is basically wrong. A scientist indeed is responsible for what he says or publishes, like anybody else in our society. The misuse of scientific ideas does not remain "potential." More than 50 years ago, Gobineau's ideas led to a human disaster in Europe. Racial laws and discrimination were neither new nor unique to the Germany of this period; even in 1913, Géza von Hoffman reviewed in his book *Die Rassenhygiene in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (München: Lehmann) the racial laws of various states of the United States, laws that followed ideas comparable to Gobineau's.

In contrast to the discovery of nuclear fission, which was completely new, history has shown with painful consequences to humankind how ideas about rank orders of races can be used for the political justification of injustice. Those physical anthropologists in the Third Reich who used the ideas of the inequality of races, and thus laid the groundwork for racial discrimination and the holocaust in this period, rightfully have been held morally responsible for their influence. In addition, anybody who thinks that in a democratic society potential ideological explosives will be defused by democratic processes is wrong, because the comparison between three races could be only the beginning. Ethologists like Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989) have shown how demagogic processes use humankind's tendency for the justification of ostracism. Given this background, the Rushton statements have great demagogic potential. In addition, these statements and the methods employed to prove them can be used to vindicate nearly every ethnic conflict and (feminists, watch out) even gender differences (Orientals>Anglo-Saxon [males>females]>Italians>Arabs>Blacks). These problems are known to Rushton: *"Fortunately a more enlightened research climate for the study of racial variation may be occurring, at least as indicated by the increasing popular interest . . . and the willingness of front rank journals to consider their differences"* (Rushton, 1988a, p. 1038). Public interest and articles in front rank journals indeed may create the factoids mentioned above. Because Rushton moves on highly sensitive ground, we wish he would see his responsibility more clearly and adjust his scientific methods and argumentation. It is a pity that Rushton's work in the area of r/K selection has these shortcomings, for his work on genetic similarity theory is sound and promising (Rushton et al., 1984).

Last, but not least, from the political perspective there are severe implications for human ethology (at least in continental Europe). Human ethology should never play the role that physical anthropology played in the past, namely, delivering (even involuntarily) arguments for fascist ideology. Thus, it is the responsibility of every human ethologist to prevent the misuse of the ideas he or she produces.

Bibliography

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1988). *Der Mensch das riskierte Wesen.* Piper, München.

Rushton, J.P. & Bogaert, A.F. (1987). Race differences in sexual behaviour: Testing an evolutionary hypothesis. *J. of Res. in Pers.* 21, 529-551.

Rushton, J.P. (1988). Race differences in behaviour: A review and evolutionary analysis. *Person. Individ. Diff.*, 9, 1009-1024.

Rushton, J.P. (1988a). The reality of racial differences: A rejoinder with new evidence. *Person. Individ. Diff.*, 9, 1035-1040.

Rushton, J.P., Russel, R.J.H., & Wells, A.W. (1984). Genetic similarity theory: Beyond kin-selection. *Behaviour Genetics*, 14, 179-192.

Comment on J.P. Rushton's Work on r/K Differences in Man

by: Sean Neill, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, England.

Given the fundamental importance of the r/K distinction to Rushton's work, there is singularly little on how the environments of the various races might have differed and the functional effects of these differences, though alternative explanations are sometimes discussed (e.g. Rushton & Bogaert 1988). For example, if the theory is correct, physical and ecological differences within groups, for example between the Dinka and the Pygmies, might be expected to be accompanied by behavioural and psychological differences similar to those between groups.

At present such within-group differences, if they exist, produce variance which could be masking the true extent of any differences between groups.

In conversation with Rushton, it is clear that he feels that the quality of evidence available, or likely to be available, about the ecological conditions of the various races is too poor to justify expenditure of research time on it, as an alternative to collecting other types of data. While this argument has considerable force, it does imply that the whole edifice of the theory could be built on foundations of sand. The differences between groups could instead, as I. Silverman suggested at the Edinburgh conference, be related to differences in male-male competition. If African peoples were better able to rely on plant food than Caucasian or Oriental peoples in colder climates, male involvement in feeding a family might have been less vital. As in recent African hunter-gatherers, female gathering would have been the main foundation of the diet. The limited responsibilities of the male hunters would have allowed them much more freedom of action to spend their time competing for women than hunters in colder climates whose families were dependent on their efforts. Equally if a northern hunter was killed or injured in a quarrel over women, his existing children might starve, while the children of a disabled tropical hunter might survive on what their mother could gather.

This explanation seems to me as convincing, and as uncontaminated by evidence, as that advanced by Rushton.

Reference:

Rushton, J.P. & Bogaert, A.F. (1988). Race versus social class differences in sexual behaviour: a follow-up test of the r/K dimension. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 22; 259-272.

Race: Differences, Concepts and Politics

by: Ian Vine, Interdisciplinary Human Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford DB7 1DP, England.

Jean-Philippe Rushton has provoked hot and antagonistic political controversy with his theory of racial differences in peoples' genetic selectedness along the r/K reproductive strategy continuum (Rushton, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). In claiming consistent superiority, amongst several dimensions of behavioural 'advances', in the increasing order: Negroid, Caucasoid, Mongoloid populations, Rushton has been charged with giving unintended or even deliberate ammunition for ideologues of racial supremacy. Media dissemination of his theory will certainly have caused perceived insult and distress to many black people.

As I have argued against sociobiology's political critics — like Rose, Kamin & Lewontin (1984) — (Vine, 1985), in fact most of its offences are in the distorting eye of the beholder when hypotheses of genetic differences are advanced. Censoring dangerous ideas in science is a serious compromise of the unfettered search for truth — and evolution's value-neutrality is precisely what cannot preclude uncovering morally uncomfortable facts about our natures.

Yet truth is arguably not the pre-eminent human value in every case and context. At times the prevention of human misery is both closer to reproduction-related values which natural selection *does* promote, and more in accord with our fitness-transcending, self-conscious, *moral* choices. There is at least an extra-scientific political case for particular caution in promoting ideas which stress only one, potentially divisive side of our evolution by highlighting genetic competition and differences (e.g. Bateson, 1986; Kitcher, 1985). Vine (in.prep.) examines the nature and limits of our political, moral, and scientific responsibility as ethological theorists and researchers, proposing ethical guidelines which would set some constraints on the publicizing of contentious claims about race differences — but would in no way obstruct the scientific discovery process itself.

My main concern with Rushton's ideas is, however, at that morally evaluative level closest to the scientific issues themselves. I make no attempt here to address other more technical empirical issues on which Rushton may deserve to be squarely challenged (e.g. Zuckerman & Brody, 1988; and I.S.H.E. 1989 conference papers by Feierman and by Silverman — cf. *Ethology & Sociobiology*, 10(5), 1989). But what I do wish to challenge is the intrusion of socially evaluative concepts, where the theory should deal rigorously with more value-neutral ones, if it is not to be unnecessarily and offensively more amenable to abuse by racists than is acceptable.

Differing cultural traditions will put social *value* upon a variety of human attributes *even if dominant human cultures regrettably strive to impose theirs on all dimensions of social comparison and judgmental preference. Thus hypotheses of Rushton's racial ordering for maturation rates, birthrates, longevity, sexdrive, and even temperament variables happen to be relatively free of cross-cultural uniformity as to what is judged most desirable. Blacks may feel proud of being attributed a higher level of sexual activity, for example — whereas puritanical Caucasoids from Christian and Muslim moral traditions value its reduction.*

This does not hold for intelligence, which is valued ubiquitously in some form or other, nor for Rushton's 'social organization' cluster of variables, which encompasses marital stability, mental resilience, law-abidingness, and altruism. The issue of racial variation in intelligence is one around which controversy still abounds strongly (cf. Flynn, 1988 on Mongoloid IQ scores). But here debates have been potentially constructive in exposing how readily the 'heritability' concept misleads us about how crucial favorable environments are for realizing performance manifestations of genetic 'potential'. This may also prove true through further investigation of Rushton's social variables k but meanwhile genetic differences are being held to underlie racially differentiated attributes for which the consensual norms relate high scores to *moral worth.*

Clearly the measures underlying this part of Rushton's research can be challenged as to how culture-fair they are — as is the case for another measure of moral maturity, namely that used by Kohlberg in his pursuit of scores for moral reasoning about justice and rights (Vine, 1986). The difference is that while Kohlberg pursues the safe, liberal hypothesis of human equality in moral potential, Rushton argues for ethnic variations. The latter claim is at least as analytically problematic in terms of disconfounding moral "advances" from co-variations in sociopolitical context, the legacy of imperialist domination, the content of normative codes and their relation to conduct, and — in cases like crime within multi-ethnic societies — the influence of prejudice itself. (For example, a recent British survey has revealed police selectivity in apprehending and charging blacks, while legal discrimination makes them mas-

sively more likely to be imprisoned for a given crime than whites.)

Too much of Rushton's "socio organization" or morality-related data hinges upon highly ambiguous questionnaire measures, susceptible to systematic cultural difference in the significance of items — which may advantage Mongoloids and disadvantage Negroids. In fact, even in Britain, his altruism measure failed to predict readiness for donations to the charity Oxfam (Plant, in prep.). Whether altruism is considered in the service of in-group members *or* racially alien strangers, by an informant, must be sensitively and intensively explored. Scores on this variable, and related ones like empathy, nurturance, aggression and even assertiveness may mean little — in terms of behavioural differences in basic prosocial dispositions between ethnic groupings — without careful monitoring of the content of moral codes, and the extent to which moral self-extension is universalised beyond one's in-group (Vine, 1986, 1987).

The problem of comparisons is highlighted further in measures of law-abidingness. A group that is culturally dominated by a surrounding and often oppressive majority from another ethnic background, may assimilate the latter's norms, or reject them in favour of a differing *in-group* morality coupled to *out-group* hostility. This undoubtedly plays a part in the higher crime rates for blacks of Negroid origin in North America and Europe, in contrast to the lower rates for Mongoloids. Caucasoid minorities dominated by other groups in the latter's indigenous societies are rare, thanks to the continuation of covert imperialism and the fact that Western liberal values have had such impact upon some of the most powerful Mongoloid societies' norms.

In research involving ethnic differences, valid science cannot avoid taking account of how power-politics impacts upon minorities within multi-cultural societies. Any simple measures of moral maturity may measure little more than *readiness to conform* to the dominant culture's normative prescriptions. This may bear no simple relation to the *in-group* conformity which would have been often critical for reproductive success in our ancestral environments. And ease of assimilation to a dominant culture will depend upon overlaps in normative content, and a readiness to extend in-group boundaries, that will hinge upon the groups' diverging historical traditions and inter-group relations.

My first conclusion is that Rushton should re-conceptualize his moral and prosociality variables in line with what his measures are likely to signify at the level of psycho-social realities. Preparedness for ready *assimilation* of cultural norms, and for their situational adjustment, is the kind of variable which — while being more psychologically 'basic' than culturally-shaped normative *content* of rules — seems more likely to differ between populations with differing ecological histories (cf. Hinde, 1987). And it has the appropriate level of value-neutrality to make it less easily susceptible to supremacist interpretations. It also reduces the temptation to infer that Negroids are somehow less morally good on principles — which is bound to cause deep offence and resistance.

In fact Kohlbergian data place *most* people, even in socio-educationally advantaged Euro-American societies, at the intermediate 'conventional' moral level of his stages 3 and 4. Morality *is* compliance with authority, or conformity to ethnocentric and collectively approved normative rules. (In contrast with the rarity of fully 'principled' morality in the sense of universalized conceptions of human moral equality.) If the predominant motives for respecting moral precepts are linked to social compliance, then the content of the norms should be most predictive of how most people act — but remain heavily shaped by cultural history.

Rushton has every right to hypothesize that an r/K gene-selection framework predicts his racial ordering of what I have identified as *conformity and assimilation-readiness* variables. But formulating the hypothesis this way helps to expose how fragile a genetic differences claim may be. For one thing, we may argue that r-selected groups should score higher rather than lower — in that effectiveness as an opportunistic procreator requires greater skill in making oneself acceptable to strangers by mimicry of their value-systems. If Negroid moral conduct reflected r-biased genotypes, this ethnic groups might — be more predisposed for assimilating alien norms than K-biased races. In fact the complex, largely cultural nature of conformity and related phenomena seems evident. Muslim Asians in Britain were exceptionally law-abiding until the Salman Rushdie controversy exposed fundamental moral differences in commitment to liberal values. Now those most committed to conservative Islamic values have begun to reject and violate our legal framework for personal liberties. The focus of conformity is now on in-group values instead.

These kinds of counter-examples may be susceptible to accommodation with Rushton's theory, as he claims is possible with another — the low 'social organization' scores of Mongoloid Amerindians. But it is clear that much more empirical and theoretical refinement are required before his thesis can be adjudged well-confirmed. I welcome his resilient determination to continue in such a task; but I would respectfully urge him to at least adopt less evaluatively problematic conceptualizations of some of his measures, and to stress the tentative nature of any conclusions which can be drawn at his stage.

References:

Bateson, P.P.G. (1986). Sociobiology and human politics. In S. Rose and L. Appignnanesi (eds.), *Science and Beyond.* Blackwell: Oxford.

Flynn, J.R. (1988). Japanese intelligence simply fades away: A rejoinder to Lynn (1987). *Psychologist,* 1, 348-350.

Hinde, R.A. (1987). *Individuals, Relationships and Culture.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kitcher, P. (1985). *Vaulting Ambition — Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature.* MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.

Plant, M.B. (in prep.). *The Application of Social Psychology to the Stimulation of Charitable Donation.* Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bradford.

Rose, S., Kamin, L.J. & Lewontin, R.C. (1984). *Not in our Genes.* Penguin: Harmondsworth, Middlesex.

Rushton, J.P. (1988a). Race differences in behaviour: A review and evolutionary analysis. *Personality & Individual Differences,* 9, 1009-1024.

Rushton, J.P. (1988b). The reality of racial differences: A rejoinder with new evidence. *Personality & Individual Differences,* 9, 1035-1040.

Rushton, J.P. (1988c). Do r/K reproductive strategies apply to human differences? *Human Ethology Newsletter,* 5(8), 4-5.

Vine, I. (1985). Political implications of sociobiology — social Darwinist or socialist? British Association for the Advancement of Science annual Meeting, 26-30th August, Glasgow.

Vine, I. (1986). Moral maturity in socio-cultural perspective: Are Kohlberg's stages universal? In S. Modgil & C. Modgil (eds), *Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy*. Falmer Press: Lewes, Sussex.

Vine, I. (1987). Inclusive fitness and the self-system: The roles of human nature and socio-cultural processes in intergroup discrimination. In V. Reynolds, V.S.F. Falger & I. Vine (eds), *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism*. Croom Helm & University of Georgia Press: London & Athens, Georgia.

Vine, I. (in prep.). *Science, Values and Politics: Sociobiology and Moral Morality*. MOSAIC Monographs.

Zuckerman, M. & Brody, N. (1988). Oysters, rabbits and people: A critique of "Race differences in behaviour" by J.P. Rushton. *Personality & Individual Differences*, 9, 1025-1033.

Comments on the Non-naive Social Responsibility of Intellectuals

by: Gail Zivin, Ph.D., Professor of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour, Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, PA, 19107, U.S.A.

The furor in response to the media's presentation of Philippe Rushton's work was entirely predictable. And so was the inflammatory nature of that presentation. Some readers will recall a similar uproar in the mid-60's over Arthur Jensen's claim that heritability estimates of IQ proved a genetic basis for the average 15 point difference between Western blacks and whites.

In both cases, the public media played a key role by representing the researchers' ideas and their social implications (which the researchers did not publish or which they qualified in careful but academic style) as the WORD of SCIENCE. That is, as the final word. Public media are not designed, nor are its average consumers oriented, to characterize a scientific report as a developed hypothesis requiring serious questioning and further test. This is even less likely for a report with emotionally provocative social implications.

We all know these facts about the media and the public, of course. Yet, it must be a very academic knowledge. Over and over again,intellectuals — or academics — seem to forget the predictable consequences of media presentations of their work. Perhaps, however, they do not forget but hold the opinion that they have no responsibility for what others do with their intellectual products. I must agree that one can have no full responsibility for what one cannot control. But as was demonstrated last year by a man who had the political savvy to become candidate for president of the US, to say nothing on a topic because its public interpretation is morally or intellectually beneath oneself or beneath one's intentions for the topic, can have devastating effects for that self through public opinion. Ahh, egocentricity.

In the present case the damage goes beyond what might accrue to the individual researcher and his theory. The greatest potential damage is to the conception of ethology's (and ISHE's) rigor and disinterestedness, as held by respected persons who might know very little about ethology: our non-ethological colleagues, our young students, and the public and officials who sponsor our work. (Please notice that there is, in the public and brief presentations of Rushton's claims, the public *appearance* of lack of rigor and of great social insensitivity. This public appearance exists even if other forms of the work should belie that appearance, and public appearance is all that these comments are meant to address.)

By here singling out public media presentations as a key contributor in the Rushton case, in past cases, and in future cases, I gingerly make three proposals for ISHE, for ethologists, and for all other socio/psychological/biological researchers:

1. That the ISHE Newsletter always carry a paragraph in a prominent place that states that no material in the Newsletter is selected by critical peer review and thus material is printed only to foster free and creative exchange of (even outrageous) ideas between researchers. That material appears in the Newsletter never implies the truth of those ideas, ISHE's support of them, nor any support for any policy implications that one might be able to draw from them.

2. That ISHE (and other intellectual organizations of social/psychological/biological researchers pass two policies (not "ethical policies," as that would assume less naivete and less egocentricity of ourselves and our peers than I believe is realistic):

a. Formally disapproving of researchers *bringing* their work to the attention of the public media, but formally urging researchers whose work has come to that attention to stay in that area in order to clarify misconceptions and oversimplifications and, most importantly, to hold the same responsibility that one does in intellectual publications: to put forth the arguments *against* one's own position. Furthermore to urge researchers to be alert to the flavor of the particular public media contexts in which they allow themselves to be involved.

b. Formally disapproving of statements, whether in the academic or public media, that are worded in ways that corroborate simplistic social stereotypes. Statements that could be so construed should have immediate and clear qualifications of how the simplistic stereotype is not an accurate characterization of the findings nor of persons in that category.

3. That ISHE or ethologists generally start a function that could be construed as "Ethologists for Media Responsibility." This could be a cadre of interested and media-sophisticated ethologists who would be notified when a big public media fuss appears to be showing ethology as simplistic/non-rigorous/biased/political/etc. They would quickly devise a way to get the further attention of the media to show the complexity of the real issue/methodology. They would have to be quite creative in making this non-inflammatory information attractive enough to get the expanded attention.

By making these suggestions I could be charged with lingering amounts of the same naivete and/or egocentricity that I am

deploring and trying to hinder. I wish that someone would come up with more potent ideas to address the public media problem, while still preserving academic freedom of topic, absence of censorship, and sensitivity to the harm that can be furthered by our statements about our work as well as interpretations of it.

The Study of Race Differences: A Response to Commentaries

by: J. Philippe Rushton, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2, Canada.

As a reading of the commentaries makes clear, cherished values conflict in the study of racial and ethnic differences. All of us desire a humane and decent world in which we and our children's children can live in harmony with people of different backgrounds. All of us also desire to see increases in scientific knowledge. All will differ somewhat, of course, in the weightings assigned to these values in particular instances of perceived incompatibility. More problematic, people will also differ in what they consider to be a just society and a scientific advance. It is even interesting to conjecture on the ethological influences that mold such differences (e.g., see Tellegen et al., 1988). My view, obviously, is that the study of racial group differences is important in its own right; we need to know where the differences came from and why they remain. The study of race differences may even shed light on important evolutionary processes.

First, the behavioral and morphological data, in which Caucasoids consistently average *between* Negroids and Mongoloids, can be used to help decide between alternative reconstructions of human evolution. Current thinking among physical anthropologists who use molecular biology (blood group, serum protein, mtDNA, and nuclear DNA) to buttress the paleontological data, involves a recent single-origin model for the emergence of modern humans instead of multiregional-origin models (Stringer & Andrews, 1988; Simons, 1989). An African beginning is envisaged, perhaps even as recently as 140,000 to 290,000 years ago with an African-non African split occurring perhaps only 110,000 years ago, then a European-Asian split about 41,000 years ago. Thus the sequence in which the races emerged in earth history parallels the phased linearity of the suite of *r/K* characters including brain size and intelligence test scores (Rushton, 1988). This parallel is not readily predictable from the multiregional origin models based on long periods of separation, in which no consistent pattern of character appearance is expected.

Then, there is the much neglected but intriguing question of whether there is a directional or progressive trend toward greater complexity and intelligence over evolutionary time. Bonnder (1980) has shown that the later the emergence of an animal group in earth history, the larger is its brain size, and the greater is its culture. A similar trend of increasing brain size over geological time occurred with the dinosaurs during the 150 million years that they dominated the earth (Russell, 1989). It is well established that the hominid fossils show a three-fold increase in relative brain size over the last 3 million years (Jerison, 1973). And, with anatomically modern humans, it is the most recently emerged Mongoloid populations which have the largest brains and the highest IQ scores.

Should such issues as "progress" be raised in the context of human racial differences? Might they not be misrepresented and have negative consequences? Should not a higher criterion, therefore, be placed on the expression of such views? Hans Eysenck answered these questions at the Edinburgh Meeting: (a) it is impossible to predict the consequences of advances in scientific knowledge; (b) social policies based on ignorance and incorrect theorizing are likely to be counter-productive; and (c) the use of double standards and, in effect, selective censorship is abhorrent and must be avoided. Thus we must have faith that the more open and fuller the research dialogue, the quicker will be our gains in understanding. Only in this way can the mutual respect that Eibl-Eibesfeldt writes about come into being and the technical issues raised by some of the commentators be properly addressed.

One misperception among some commentators concerns the universality of the findings. Some apparently thought the data are based primarily on negroid-Caucasoid differences in the U.K. and U.S.A. where they could be attributed to "oppression" and "imperialism". However, my research broadened the data base on race by (a) including Mongoloid samples (one-third of the world's population), (b) including other Negroid samples (most black people live in post-colonial Africa), and (c) considering many multifaceted life-history variables including brain size, maturation rate, longevity, personality, rate of twinning, sexual behaviour, and social organization. I concluded that despite much overlap the average racial group differences are to be found worldwide, in Africa and Asia, as well as in Europe and north America. Such a network of evidence allows more chance of finding valid theories than do single items. The central question thus remains: Why do Caucasian populations average so consistently between Mongoloid and Negroid populations on so many variables?

Finally it is important to emphasize that considerable variability exists within each major group, as well as within numerous subdivisions. Thus there are important individual differences to be considered over and above the average tendencies that I believe exist. Racism is the failure to acknowledge such within-group variation and to treat (usually mistreat) people in a category as though they were all the same and to deny them their human rights. Feierman is the strongest spokesperson for the belief that this is what is occurring, but it is not.

From an evolutionary point of view it is to be expected that populations will differ, genetically, in the mechanisms underlying their behaviour. Adopting such an outlook does not disconfirm the democratic ideal. As E.O. Wilson (1978) put it: "We are not compelled to believe in biological uniformity to affirm human freedom and dignity" (p. 52). He went on to quote Bressler (1968) that "An ideology that tacitly appeals to biological equality as a condition for human emancipation corrupts the idea of freedom. Moreover, it encourages decent men to tremble at the prospect of 'inconvenient' findings that may emerge in future scientific research.

References:

Bonner, J.T. (1980). *The Evolution of Culture in Animals.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Bressler, M. (1968). Sociobiology, biology and ideology. In M.D. Glass (Ed.), *Genetics.* New York: Rockefeller University Press.

Jerison, H.J. (1973). *Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence.* New York: Academic Press.

Rushton, J.P. (1988). Race differences in behaviour: A review and evolutionary analysis. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 9, 1009-1024.

Russell, D.A. (1989). *An Odyssey in Time: The Dinosaurs of North America*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Simons, E.L. (1989). Human origins. *Science*, 245, 1343-1350.

Stringer, C.B., & Andrews, P. (1988). Genetic and fossil evidence for the origin of modern humans. *Science*, 239, 1263-1268.

Tellegen, A., Lykken, D.T., Bouchard, T.J. Jr., Wilcox, K.J., Segal, N.L., & Rich, S. (1988). Personality similarity in twins reared apart and together. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54, 1031-1039.

Wilson, E.O. (1978). *On Human Nature*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

CURRENT LITERATURE

Material for this section of the newsletter should be sent directly to the editor. A sentence or two of summary would increase the value of readers.

Barkow, J.H. (1989). Darwin, Sex, and Status: Biological approaches to mind and culture, *Sociology and Anthropology*, University of Toronto Press. (Department of Anthropology, Dalhousie University, Canada.)

Bernieri, F. J. (1988). Coordinated movement and rapport in teacher-student interactions. *Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour*, 12, 120-138. (Oregon State University, Department of Psychology, Corvallis, OR 97331).

Berry, D.S. & Brownlow, Sheila (1989). Were the physiognomists right? Personality correlates of facial babyishness. *Personality and Social Psychology*, 15, 266. (So. Methodist University, Dept. of Psychology, Dallas, TX 75275, USA).

Betzig, L. (1989). Rethinking human ethology: A response to some recent critiques. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 315-324. (Univ. of Michigan, Evolut. Human Behav. Prog., 1524 Rackham, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA).

Borgerhoff Mulder, Monique. (1989). Menarche, Menopause and Reproduction in the Kipsigis of Kenya. *J. biosoc. Sci.*, 21, 179-192. (Evolution and Human Behaviour Program, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, U.S.A.).

Borgerhoff Mulder, Monique. (1989). Marital Status and Reproductive performance in Kipsigis Women: Re-evaluating the Polygyny-Fertility Hypothesis. *Population Studies*, 43, 285-304.

Borgerhoff Mulder, Monique. (1989). Early maturing Kipsigis women have higher reproductive success than late maturing women and cost more to marry. *Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology*, 24, 145-153. (Evolution and Human Behaviour Program, Rackham Building, University of michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1070, U.S.A.).

Burgess, J.W. (1989). The social biology of human populations: Spontaneous group formation conforms to evolutionary predictions of adaptive aggregation patterns. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 343-360. (Stanford Univ., Dept. of Psychiatry & Behav. Sci., Stanford, CA 94305).

Burns, A.L.; Mitchell, G.; & Obradovich, S. (1989). Of sex roles and strollers-female and male attention to toddlers at the zoo. *Sex Roles*, 20, 309-316. (University of California-Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA).

Clark, Alfred W., Trahair, Richard, & Graetz, Brian R. (1989). Social darwinism: A determinant of nuclear arms policy and action. *Human Relations*, 42, 289-304. (LaTrobe University, Department of Sociology, Bundoora, VIC 3083, Australia).

Cole, Pamela M., Jenkins, Peggy A., & Shott, Cora T. (1989). Spontaneous expressive control in blind and slighted children. *Child Development*, 60, 683-688. (NIMH, Development Psychology Lab Bldg. 15K, Rockville, MD 20892, USA).

Comfort, A. (1989). The biological foundation of space and the evolution of spatial dimension: Comment. *Journal of Social and Biological Structures*, 12, 33-36. (The Windmill House, The Hill, Cranbrook TN17 3AH, Kent, ENGLAND.

Connor, K. (1989). Aggression: Is it in the eye of the beholder. *Play & Culture*, 2, 213-217. (Univ. of Pa. Grad. Sch. of Educ. 3700 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA).

Corballis, Michael C. (1989). Laterality and human evolution. *Psychological Review*, 96, 492-505.(Univ. Auckland, Dept. Psychology, Auckland, New Zealand).

Cosmides, Leda (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task 187. *Cognition*, 31, (Stanford University, Department of Psychology, Bldg. 420, Stanford, CA 94305, USA).

Davis, J.C. (1989). Political trust: Its biological roots. *Journal of Social and Biological Structures*, 12, 37-52. (University of Oregon, Department of Political Science, Eugene, OR 97403, USA).

Dodd, D.K.; Harcar, V.; Foerch, B.J.; & Anderson, H.T. (1989). Face-ism and facial expressions of women in magazine photos, *THE psychological RECORD*, 39, 325-332. (Eastern Illinois University, Dept. of Psychology, Charleston, IL 61920 USA).

Duclos, S.E., Laird, J.D., Schneider, E., Sexter, M., Stern, L., & Vanlighten, (1989). Emotion-specific effects of facial expressions and postures on emotional experience, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 100-108. (Clark Univ., Frances Hiatt Scholl Psychology, Worcester, MA, 01610, USA).

Graber, R.B. (1989). A population pressure alternative to a sociobiological theory of the rise of escalatory intergroup competition. *Politics and the Life Sciences*, 7, 203-205. (NE Missouri State University, Division of Social Science, Kirksville, MO 63501 USA).

Harrop, A., Foulkes, C., & Daniels, M. (1989). Observer agreement calculations. The role of primary data in redu-

cing obfuscation. *The British Journal of Psychology*, 80, 181-190. (Liverpool Polytech. School of Humanities, CF Mott Campus, Liverpool Road, Prescott L34 1NP, Merseyside, ENGLAND)

Hinde, R.A. (1989). Ethological and relationships approaches. *Annals of Child Development: Six Theories of Child Development: Revised Formulations and Current Issues, VOL 6.* (MRC unit on the Development & Integration of Behaviour (Cambridge University), Madingley, Cambridge, ENGLAND).

Jones, S.S. & Raag, Tarja (1989). Smile production in older infants: The importance of a social recipient for the facial signal. *Child Development*, 60, 251. (Indiana Univ., Dept. of Psychology, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA).

Laursen, B. & Hartup, W. W. (1989). The dynamics of preschool children's conflicts. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, 35, 281-298. (Univ. Minnesota, Inst. Child Dev. 51 E. River Rd., Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA.)

Lindgren, J.R. (1989). Non-kin adoption and sociobiology. *Journal of Social and Biological Structures*, 12, 83-86. (Lehigh University, Department of Philosophy, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA).

Makin, J.W. & Porter, R.H. (1989). Attractiveness of lactating females' breast odors to neonates. *Child Development*, 60, 803-811. (Vanderbilt Univ., George Peabody College Teachers, Box 154, Nashville, TN 37203, USA)

Masters, R.D. & Sullivan D.G. (1989). Facial displays and political leadership in France. *Behavioral Processes*, 19, 1-30 (Dartmouth College, Dept. Government, Hanover, NH, 03755, USA).

Mazur, A. & Cataldo, M. (1989). Dominance and deference in conversation. *Journal of Social and Biological Structures*, 12, 87-100. (Syracuse University, Maxwell Graduate School, Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse, NY 13233, USA).

Meyer, P. (1989). Universal patterns of social behaviour: How do similar structures arrive from genetic variability? (German). *HOMO*, 38, 133-143. (Buchenstr 19, D-8902 Neusass, Federal Republic of GERMANY).

Palmer, C.T. (1980). Rape in nonhuman animal species: Definitions, evidence, and implications. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 26, 355-374. (Phoenix College, 3224 W. Indian Sch B131, Phoenix, AZ 85017, USA).

Pelligrini, A.D. (1989). What is a category? The case of Rough-and-tumble play. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 331-342. (Univ. Georgia, Dept. Ele. Educ. 427 Aderhold Hall, Athens, GA. 30602, USA).

Plooij, F.X. & Rijt-Plooij, H.H.C. van de (1989). Evolution of human parenting: Canalization, new types of learning, and mother-infant conflict. In J.B. Hopkins, M.-G. Pêcheux & H. Papousek (Eds.), *Infancy and Education: Psychological Considerations* [special issue]. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, 4, 177-192. (Keywords: Canalization, Educability, Mother-infant conflict, Vulnerability, Control-System-Theory; Paedological Inst. of the City of Amsterdam, Ijsbaanpad 9, 1076 CV Amsterdam, The NETHERLANDS).

Porter, R.H., Boyle, C., Hardister, T. & Balogh, R.D. (1989). Research Note: Salience of neonates' facial features for recognition by family members. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 325-330. (Vanderbilt Univ., George Peabody Coll. Teachers, Dept. Psy. & Human Dev., Box 154, Nashville, TN 37203 USA; Fathers, aunts, and grandmothers of stimulus infants correctly identified photographs of those babies. Mothers identified photographs of their own infant when the eyes, nose, or mouth were masked, and likewise recognized isolated facial features of their infant. The newborn's face comprises several features that may mediate individual recognition within hours of birth).

Rotter, N.G. & Rotter, G.S. (1988). Sex differences in the encoding and decoding of negative facial emotions. *Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour*, 12, 139. (New Jersey Institute Technology, Department Org. & Social Science, Newark, NY 07102).

Rushton, J.P. (1989). Genetic similarity, human altruism and group selection. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 12, 503-559. This paper presents an overview of the theory and all the data gathered in its favor followed by commentaries from 33 different researchers, including J. Archer, M. Daly, R.I.M. Dunbar, I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, H. J. Eysenck, A.R. Jensen, M. Leek & P.K. Smith, R.D. Masters, V. Reynolds, M. Ridley, P.L. van den Berghe, I. Vine, B. Waldman, and D.S. Wilson. (Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada).

Rushton, J.P. (1989). Similarity and ethnicity mediate human relationships, but why? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 12, 548-559. This is the author's response to the 33 commentaries listed above. (Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada).

Rushton, J. Philippe (1989). Genetic similarity in male friendships. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 361-374. (Univ. Western Ontario, Dept. of Psychology, London, Ontario, CANADA N6A 5C2.)

Rushton, J. Philippe (1989). Japanese inbreeding depression scores: Predictors of cognitive differences between blacks and whites. *Intelligence*, 13, 43-52. (University of Western Ontario, Department of Psychology, London, Ontario, CANADA N6A 5C2).

Schino, G. & Aureli, F. (1989). Do men yawn more than women? *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 374-378. (CNR 1st Psicol, Reparto Psicol, Compareta, VIA ULISSE Aldrovandi 16B, 1-00197 Rome, ITALY.)

Small, M.F. (1989). Aberrant sperm and the evolution of human mating patterns. *Animal Behaviour*, 38, 544-545. (Dept. of Anthropology, McGraw Hill, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA).

Sogon, S. & Masutani, M. (1989). Identification of emotion from body movements: A cross-cultural study of Americans and Japanese. *Psychological Reports*, 65, 35-46. (Osaka Gakuin University, Dept. of Psychology, Suita, Osaka 564, JAPAN).

Soppe, H.J.G. (1988). Age differences in the decoding of affect authenticity and intensity. *Journal of Nonverbal Beha-*

viour, 12, 107-119. (Tilburg University, POB 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, NETHERLANDS.)

Standen, V. and Foley, R.A. (1989). *Comparative Socioecology. The behavioural ecology of Humans and other Mammals.* Special Publication Number 8 of the British Ecological Society. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, London, Edinburgh, Boston, Melbourne).

Stuart, C.I.J.M. (1989). On evolutionary causality. *Cybernetica*, 32, 87-102 Clinical Science Bldg., Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA T6G, 2G3.)

Troisi, A., Pasini, A., Bersani, G., Grispini, A., and Ciani, N. (Italy) (1989). Psychosocial stress and minor psychiatric morbidity. A community study in Taiwan. *Journal of Affective Disorders*, 17, 129-136. (University of Rome 2, Cattedra Clin. Psichiat., Via Guattani 14, 1-00161 Rome, ITALY).

Tucker, J.S. & Riggio, R.E. (1988). The role of social skills in encoding posed and spontaneous facial expressions. *Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour*, 12, 87-97. (California State University, Fullerton, Department of Psychology, Fullerton, CA 92634, USA).

Turke, Paul W. (1989). Evolution and the Demand for Children. *Population and Development Review*, 15, 61-90. (Argues that demographic transition follows, in part, from the decline in kinship networks that occurs during modernization.)

Wallbott, H.G. (1988). Big girls don't frown, big boys don't cry: Gender differences of professional actors in communicating emotion via facial expression. *Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour*, 12, 98-106. (University Giessen, Fachbereich Psychology 06, Otto Behaghel Str 10F, D-6300 Giessen, Federal Republic GERMANY).

Wiener, M., Budney, S., & Wood., L. (1989). Nonverbal events and psychotherapy. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 9, 487-504. (Clark University, Dept. of Psychology, Worcester, MA, 01610, USA).

BULLETIN BOARD

Call for Proposals

The Council of the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences has extended its call for proposals and nominations for the editorship of the journal *Politics and the Life Sciences*. The journal is published twice each year, and it has a broad-based list of subscribers both in the U.S. and in over twenty foreign countries. Most major U.S. university libraries subscribe.

The deadline for proposals from potential host institutions and editors is June 1, 1990. Joint proposals from more than one institution will be considered. Proposals should include descriptions of released time for the faculty editor(s), identification and qualifications of the editor(s), and financial contributions from host institutions. Allowing for a transition year after the acceptance of a proposal, it is anticipated that the journal will change sites on or around July 1, 1991. Those contemplating a proposal are encouraged to telephone the present editor for further information. A fact sheet on costs is available.

Inquiries and proposals should be directed to:
Thomas C. Wiegele, Editor
Politics and the Life Sciences
Social Science Research Institute
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL 60115-2854, USA.
Telephone + (815) 753-9674

Membership Renewals

If the date on your mailing label is earlier than the current year, it is time to renew your membership. Renewal notices are not sent for economic reasons. No more than two warnings are given on the mailing label. Thereafter you are removed from the membership list.

Membership dues are U.S. $20.00 (ƒ50,00 guilders) per year (students U.S. $10.00) and U.S. $50.00 (ƒ120,00 guilders) per 3 years. The library rate is twice these amounts.

Directions for payment are given on the last page of this newsletter. Payment reaching the treasurer before February 1, May 1, August 1 or November 1, will be processed in time for indication on the mailing label of the next newsletter issue.

Please, report any errors, changes of address, etc. to the editor.

Book Review Editors

William T. Bailey, American
Dept. of Psychology, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920, U.S.A.

Ian Vine, English
Interdisciplinary Human Studies,
Un. of Bradford,
Bradford BD7 1DP, England.

Eduardo Gudynas and Fernando G. Costa, Spanish/Portuguese
c/o ASMER's Regional Office,
Casilla Correo 13125, Montevideo, Uruguay.

Jean- Claude Rouchouse, French
Association ADRET,
15, Rue Blanchard,
92260 Fontenay aux Roses, France.

Officers to the society

President
Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Max-Planck-Institut, Von-der-Tann-Strasse 3-5, D-8138 Andechs, West Germany

Vice President
Robert M. Adams
Dept. of Psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY 40475-0937, USA

Vice President for Information
Frans X. Plooij
Paedological Institute of the City of Amsterdam, address see front page

Secretary
Gail Zivin
Dept. of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, 3 Curtis Building, Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, PA 19107, USA

Treasurer
Herman Dienske
Primate Center TNO, P.O. box 5815, 2280 HY Rijswijk, The Netherlands

Membership chair
Jay Feierman
Presbyterian Behavioral Medicine Center, 1325 Wyoming Blvd., N.E.,Albuquerque, NM 87112, USA