ISHE 1984 August Meeting

The Society is meeting this year with the Animal Behavior Society, August 13-17 at Eastern Washington University in Cheney. The Human Ethology business meeting is Tuesday evening, rather than Wednesday as originally planned. An invited paper session on Human Reproductive Strategies is scheduled for Wednesday afternoon as well as other addresses and evening social events.

Registration information is available from Stephen B. Christopher, Office of Academic Affairs, Showalter Hall, Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA 99004. The Conference Center phone number is 509-359-2406.

If you have not attended an ABS/ISHE meeting, it is highly recommended. The group is small enough to encourage personal contacts and interactions. The university housing and meals keep expenses to a very manageable level.

Please submit agenda items for the business meeting to the Newsletter editor. One important item is the issue of election of officers (see note below).

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Statements of New ISHE Board Members

Each of the newly elected board members was asked to submit a statement of his/her views on human ethology. These statements are presented below.

Judith Latta Hand
University of California, Los Angeles

It is dangerous to make man see too clearly his equality with the brutes without showing him his greatness. It is also dangerous to make him see his greatness too clearly, apart from his vilenes. It is still more dangerous to leave him in ignorance of both. But it is very advantageous to show him both.

(Blaise Pascal, from Pensees)

My views regarding the study of human behavior using ethological methods are probably not unlike those of many of the society's members. This is a powerful tool in the quest for human self knowledge, principally because we do not ask what humans think they are doing, but record what they are, in fact, doing. Further, we seek to understand biological bases for the behavior discerned: how, if at all, does it contribute to social success and survival; how, if at all, does it contribute to reproductive success of the individual or of the members of the social group to which the individual belongs; and how, if at all, can it be altered with altered environmental circumstances. Hypotheses generated in this spirit and rigorously tested may tell us more about ourselves than has any human endeavor thus far. To participate in such studies is exciting.

As can be readily perceived from contemplating recent works on infanticide or rape, however, what we discover can be dispiriting. When even altruism ultimately serves selfish interests, self knowledge has the potential for great harm.

Given the above, I believe ISHE can and should perform two important functions:

The enormous complexity of the behavioral capacities and social life of the subject animal dictates an interdisciplinary approach, and at present it is not easy for different disciplines to communicate. To even approximate an understanding of human behavior, ethologists will need to incorporate relevant knowledge from many fields -- history, economics, philosophy, etc. -- into an ethological framework. Since no one can be expert in all things, ethologists must eventually communicate their ideas to historians, economists, and philosophers, for example, and, in exchange gain from them the relevant information needed to flesh out and test hypotheses. ISHE can serve well if it fosters exchange of information by specialists from many disciplines, and not just biological ones.

Second, because half truths and truths seen in isolation can be dangerous, I believe ISHE can serve well by exercising and advocating use of the highest scientific standards and restraint in drawing conclusions. It would certainly be quite wrong for the society to offer support to each year's newest trendy idea. ISHE must also consider whether it should take any active public stand. At this time, the field is immature and findings so tentative that I think it inappropriate, in general, for the society as an official body to offer either advocacy or criticism, although it occasionally might not be inappropriate to offer formal comment when egregious excesses occur in popular publications. In the distant future, when a mature field has tested general principles to offer, a more active role in educating the public may be appropriate. But we should take heed to Pascal's warning, and also remember that human ethological studies may explain what is; they can never tell us what should be.

Barbara C. L. Hold-Cavell
Max Planck Institute

Since the first Human Ethology Workshop in 1972 in Minneapolis the ISHE has developed to a remarkable group of scientists coming from different fields. While the American members were very active in organizing the newsletter, meetings or workshops, the European members -- except for the members of the United Kingdom -- do not have great contact and may even not have heard from each other. My aim for the society is therefore to reanimate the European Human Ethologists, to arrange meetings, probably together with another conference, and to take care that human ethology is represented more strongly in ethological conferences. Furthermore I would like very much to meet my American colleagues for an exchange of ideas.

As to human ethology I think the methods are not so much different from those applied in developmental psychology but the questions we ask are not the same. That is why human ethology cannot be subsumed from developmental
psychology or other human sciences. Human ethology has contributed new knowledge about the significance of non-verbal signals for interpersonal communication (Argyle & Cook, 1976; Bowley, 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1980 among others), about the relation between language and behavior (Heeschen, Schießenhövel & Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1980; Bruner, 1975) as well as about the significance of interpersonal relations for behavior (Hinde, 1979) to mention only the most important influences on other disciplines like psychology, linguistics and anthropology.

It would be desirable to emphasize more the cross-cultural research in collaboration with anthropologists - not only to reveal universals. Different cultures are, in a way, comparable to different species in which adaptive mechanisms to different environments can be studied. Reproductive strategies and sex ratio manipulations, e.g., are largely dependent from social structures, economic factors - in short: ecology - and have great influence on the behavior towards the children. The question: how do different cultures cope with their ecological situation and social structure should get more attention?

Ian Vine
University of Bradford

I welcome the opportunity both to thank members for re-electing me to the Executive Board and to express my views about human ethology in general and the Society in particular.

Regarding the Society, I probably speak for many European members in feeling somewhat remote from some of its activities because of geographic factors, and regretting not being able to participate in meetings with fellow-members. Partly for this reason I find the Newsletter simply invaluable as a link and as a source of stimulation - and my only regret is that it is not both larger and more frequent. More generally, it is unfortunate that human ethology remains a minority field in academic terms, as the thin spread of members restricts contact and activity within Europe itself. I see no ready solution to this problem, but one means of seeking to enhance interaction would be for the Society to forge closer links with allied groups, like the recently established European Sociobiological Society, and perhaps to promote a wider range of joint conferences.

As Newsletter readers of my reviews may recall, one of my main academic priorities concerns reforming the public image of human sociobiology - and especially countering the view that its political role is necessarily a reactionary one. Much of the controversy here reflects, in my view, the fact that human ethology still has to draw largely upon the general field of animal behaviour for its theoretical underpinnings. In the major task of carving out a distinctive body of theory for a specifically human ethology, we still seem to have a very long way to go, despite some useful advances in recent years towards the goal of an integration of biological and cultural evolutionary theories.

For me, many of the problems crystallize around the concept of 'human nature'. Some colleagues probably feel that it is an inherently unsatisfactory notion we would best do without altogether; but I doubt whether we could hope to excise it from our discourse if we tried to. The problem is surely that we have to reject any simple specification of an invariant human 'essence', while at the same time denying the still-widespread belief that humans are totally plastic and passive receptacles for some autonomous and unrestricted entity called 'culture'. Perhaps we can both enhance human ethology's public and academic face, and better define a distinctive core of bio-social theory, through paying more attention in future to the considerable conceptual complexities of an adequate definition of what we mean by 'human nature'.

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A Simple and Direct Method of Assessing Social Dominance in Young Children

W. C. McGrew & Helen Phtaka
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University of Stirling
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Introduction

When demand exceeds supply, organisms compete with one another for access to resources, whether these be food, shelter, affection, etc. Natural selection favours successful competitors, i.e., genes borne by individuals which use the resources more proficiently in order to enhance lifetime reproductive success. When these individuals live in a group, the patterning of competitive interactions (amongst others) over time leads to relationships; these in turn form a network which can be considered a social structure (Hinde, 1976). The competitive aspect of social structure is generally termed a social dominance hierarchy, in which group members occupy ranks.

Such a conceptual framework applies as readily to a class of children as it does to a flock of chickens or to a troop of monkeys. The resources involved may vary immensely; Children may vie for a teacher's attention while hens contend for grains of corn. Similarly, the key variables in making sense of the competition also vary across species: Body-size, age, sex, kinship, linguistic fluency, etc. In principle, the analytic approach is the same, but problems arise in putting rank-ordering into practice.

Problems with Current Methods

Curiously, most studies of social dominance in children have used indirect measures rather than direct ones. With a few exceptions, observational studies have sought to record the by-products of competition, aggression and submission, rather than the results of competition, i.e., who wins or loses access to a resource. Even when resource-related measures have been used, e.g., struggles over possession of toys, they have been combined or conflated with agonistic measures (for examples, see various studies in Omark et al., 1980). Agonistic behaviour is an epiphenomenal, indirect measure because it records the means (and even then, only some of the means) rather than the end. In terms of ecological validity, it is the ends which matter, i.e., who gains or retains access to and so benefits from a useful resource and who fails to do so. (This is not to say, of course, that agonistic behaviour is unimportant, or that it does not contribute to relationships and social structure, but so far as dominance is concerned it is a second-order measure).

Furthermore, almost all behavioural measures of social dominance rely on construction of matrices. These have obvious advantages but they have one major drawback: The number of possible dyads \( N \) dyads \(= \frac{n \times (n-1)}{2} \) or cells to be filled is large for any usefully-sized groups. For example, a group of 15 subjects means 105 cells to be filled. Also, filling the cells with adequate numbers of dyadic interactions de-
mands long hours of observation. For example, only 5 interactions per cell means 105 interactions in this case. This is even more of a strain if one is using focal-subject sampling to collect data. It is not surprising that in most cases, researchers give up before they have reached these numbers and move on to analysis with incomplete matrices (see again Omk, et al., 1980).

A New Method

What is needed is a way of studying children's social dominance which avoids indirect measures cast in time-consuming matrices. There is a measure which uses event-sampling in groups, produces data quickly and gives inter-individual rank-ordering without the manipulations of matrices. Primatologists have been using this measure for some time in studies of monkeys (Boelkins, 1967; Christopher, 1972; Clark & Dillon, 1973). A resource such as water is made available at a single, fixed point such as a drinking fountain, so that it can be used by only one monkey at a time. After a period of deprivation the resource is offered to the group and its sequential use is then noted. More than one type of ranking can be used: Order of drinking, order of reaching a criterion of drinking-time, etc. A typical competitive trial may last for a set period, e.g. 30 minutes, or until all subjects have drunk.

This method can be easily modified for use in a play-group of nursery. Instead of drinking water, the resource is a stimulating piece of apparatus such as a slot machine or video game. It is available during free play, so that the children and not the adults determine the order of access. The measures are the same as for the monkeys, except that playing time and not drinking time is recorded. A variant of the method is to introduce a new toy and follow its progress (i.e. by focal-object sampling) as it is taken over by one child from the previous user. The same measures are taken: order and duration of use by group members.

Testing the New Method

The subjects were 8 boys and 7 girls with a mean age of 49 months who attended a university play-group for 2-5 days per week. The group met in a play-room from 9-12:00 hours on week-days, and two of these hours were spent in free play. During free play the two supervising adults intervened in the children's activities only to prevent injury or damage.

A token-dispensing machine, left over from a study of discrimination learning, was fixed to the wall of the play-room. It has two round keys, which when depressed in the correct order, delivered a plastic token or sweet into a receptacle. One child at a time stood 'playing' the machine, and collecting his or her winnings, until another child took over. Six trials were run in this condition, i.e. one per morning for a total of 12 hours, and the six resulting rank-orders were averaged to produce an overall dominance ranking.

In the other condition a new toy was introduced at the beginning of a morning's session. After it had been displayed around the room by an adult so that each child saw it clearly, it was placed on a table in the middle of the room. The children were then allowed access to it, and its progress through the group was followed. Seven moveable toys were used on eight mornings (as one was used twice); these ranged from a colourful spinning top to a zig-zagging, descending runway down which a bell-bearing could be rolled. The eight trials totalling 16 hours were averaged as above to produce an overall ranking.

The three measures used were based closely on the studies on monkeys: (a) order of first contact (i.e. control of the resource; (b) order of reaching a criterion of 30 seconds of accumulated control, irrespective of number of bouts; (c) order of total amount of control-time accumulated over the two-hour trial.

Results

Within each condition, the three measures were inter-correlated, using Kendall's tau (N = 15, two-tailed). For both the token machine and the toys, all correlations were significantly positive. (See Table 1). These suggest that the set of measures for each condition is reasonably robust, but that (c), total control-time, is the weakest and most expendable of the measures.

| Table 1. Inter-correlations of three measures of priority of access to a prized resource. |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Token Machine  | Contact         | Criterion       | Total           |
| Contact        | tau = 0.84      | tau = 0.59      | tau = 0.75      |
|                | z = 4.37        | z = 3.07        | z = 3.17        |
|                | p < .0000       | p < .0000       | p < .0000       |
| Criterion      | tau = 0.60      | tau = 0.63      | tau = 0.63      |
|                | z = 3.12        | z = 3.28        | z = 3.17        |
|                | p < .0000       | p < .0001       | p < .0001       |
| Total          |                |                |                |
| Toys           | tau = 0.79      | tau = 0.63      | tau = 0.63      |
|                | z = 4.11        | z = 3.28        | z = 3.17        |
|                | p < .0000       | p < .0001       | p < .0001       |

A more interesting comparison is that between conditions, i.e. how does order of access to the token machine compare with order of access to new toys? Two of the three correlations were significantly positive. (See Table 2). This suggests that competition for access to objects is somewhat general across contexts, and that total control-time again is the least useful measure.

| Table 2. Correlations between three measures of access to two types of resource: token machine and new toys. |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Contact         | Criterion       | Total           |
| tau = 0.75      | tau = 0.68      | tau = 0.20      |
| z = 3.89        | z = 3.53        | z = 1.09        |
| p < .0001       | p < .0005       | p < .2758       |

The method needs to be tested further for validity and reliability. One step will be to compare rankings obtained from access-to-a-resource to the more usual measures of social dominance (see Syme, 1974). We expect to find positive correlations. Another step will be to titrate the number of trials, i.e. to see how few are needed to produce a satisfactory level of concordance. We expect that the amount of time invested in order to produce a useful hierarchy will be markedly less than that required for normal measures of dominance. We invite others to join us in exploring the usefulness of this sort of measure.

References


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**Book Review**

*Current Problems in Sociobiology*  
Edited by King's College Sociobiology Group  
ISBN 0521 242037 hard cover; 0 521 28520 8 paperback  
John Lazarus  
Department of Psychology  
University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England

Sociobiology was richly patronized when, at the instigation of Pat Bateuon and Nick Humphrey, King's College, Cambridge elected to support this subject in its research centre. Fellowships were awarded to Brian Bertram, Tim Clutton-Brock, Dan Rubenstein and Richard Wrangham who were joined by Robin Dunbar on an outside fellowship. At the termination of the project in 1980 a conference was organized and all those closely involved in the project were invited to speak on 'unsolved problems' in sociobiology. The present book -- reminiscent of that earlier Cambridge collation, Thorpe and Zangwill's 1961 *Current Problems in Animal Behaviour* -- contains the papers presented at that conference.

The success of the book must be judged on the problems it tackles and on their treatment. Are they interesting unsolved problems? How much closer are we to solutions after this book? More of that in a moment, after a quick gallop through the contents.

The book has seventeen chapters divided into five sections. In the first, 'Natural Selection and Sociobiology'. Dunbar tackles the old problem of evolutionary tautology. Maynard Smith classifies models of altruism. Dawkins develops his concepts of replicator and vehicle and O'Donald, a geneticist, compares population genetic and sociobiological concepts of fitness. In 'Complexity in evolutionary processes' we have Rubenstein on risk and uncertainty in evolution. Thompson on evolution without selection, Bateson forging links between development and evolution and Bommick on individual differences and population regulation. The third section 'Evolutionary conflicts of interest' contains chapters by Parker on phenotype-limited ESSs, Knowiton on parental care and sex role reversal and Clutton-Brock and Albon on mammalian investment in sons and daughters. In 'Sociability' problems of altruism are tackled by Bertram, mutualism in mammalian social evolution by Wrangham and nepotism in the Yanomamó by Chagnon. Finally 'The Problems of Comparison' has both Jarman and Harvey and Mace on inter-taxa comparisons and Davies on fitting data to models of competitive behaviour.

The book is, of course, largely conceptual in nature; ten chapters present purely verbal arguments. six include mathematical models and only one -- Chagnon's -- presents new data. Maintaining this quantitative approach to the book review, and introducing the Lazarus Index for Multi-author Books, I would judge that eleven of the chapters make a really valuable contribution, four have something interesting to say but are not up to the task -- in this case of getting somewhere with unsolved problems -- and two tell you little you didn't know already. With weightings to these three categories in the ratio 3:1:0 respectively, the book comes out well in obtaining 73% of the best possible score.

Abandoning the calculator and turning to a more qualitative assessment, a number of the chapters certainly do live up to the book's promise. Let me point to some of the more original arguments。

Dawkins' concepts of replicator and vehicle, for example, should go a long way to resolving the battle over units of selection. Much time has been wasted on the argument over whether the gene or the individual is the unit of selection, when most would agree, with Dawkins, that it is 'vehicles' (usually organisms) that rub up against selection pressures and in that sense are selected, whilst this results in the differential survival of 'replicators' (bits of DNA). As Dawkins concludes 'Replicator survival and vehicle selection are two views of the same process'.

O'Donald argues that inclusive fitness classically defined is not the same as the population genetic definition. The importance of this is that to predict accurately the conditions under which, say, altruism will evolve, population genetic modelling is essential. For some models of sibling altruism, for example, the classical approach considerably underestimates the benefits which sibs must receive before such behaviour will be maintained in the population. While this conclusion is of purely theoretical interest at present it will become of real importance once data are available on costs and benefits in the real world and models of the evolution of altruism can be more critically tested than is possible at present.

Bateson, writing with exemplary clarity, explores various links between developmental and evolutionary processes. Homeostatic mechanisms in development, for example, may buffer the effects of allelic change, rendering them neutral. Bateson suggests a way in which such phenotypically silent alleles might spread and under new circumstances find expression as a radically new phenotype. And if you are still trying to make your students understand the sterility of the nature-nurture dichotomy you could do no better than point them to the few pages which Bateson devotes to the topic.

In a chapter that searches for the roots of mammalian social patterns, Wrangham gives a key role to mutualism, allaying it with the dispersion pattern of females, which he has argued elsewhere provides a foundation on which other aspects of the social system, such as the male mating strategy, are based. He distinguishes between mutualism which reduces the fitness of those outside the mutualistic group and that which does not and predicts relationships between the type of mutualism, resource distribution, the existence of kin-groups and the evolution of altruism without either kin selection or reciprocation.

Finally, Harvey and Mace show that the use of regression analysis to estimate the slope of a line of best fit between variables in inter-taxa comparative studies generally
underestimates the true value by an unknown (and probably unknowable) amount. Given the number of such values already published, and the controversy surrounding their interpretation, there will now have to be some serious rethinking in this area. The authors point to improved statistical methods, but conclude rather pessimistically that a valid quantitative answer will often be unattainable.

As will be clear by now this is a book aimed at advancing the theoretical core of sociobiology. While some chapters could be read with profit by undergraduates (Dawkins, Bateson, Bertram and Davies) most are aimed a good deal higher. The book contains some notable successes and some chapters will be required reading for those wanting to remain at the frontiers of the subject.

The Biological Images of Man (Audiotape)
by Professor Anthony Barnett

Reviewed by Wade C. Mackey

The four part series Biological Images of Man was presented on Australian radio on the SCIENCE SHOW and was written and narrated by Professor Anthony Barnett (Professor of Zoology, Australian National University). The four programs were entitled: Homo pugnax: Violent Man; Homo egoisticus: Selfish Man; Homo operans: Conditioned Man; and Homo sapiens: The Human Species. The programs were copyrighted 1981.

The narrative style was relaxed and was interwoven with occasional bits of witty humor. The vocabulary was non-technical with all but the most essential `jargon' avoided. Music was freely used to make points and ranged from the Beatles through Mozart to Beethoven. When the views or quotes of other scientists were given, the script was read by actors/actresses. The overall product was one of professionalism without being slick. The program was not unlike an aural "Cosmos" or "The Ascent of Man."

The series was aimed at a general audience and the intent seemed three-fold: (a) to illustrate to the public a mode of reasoning on how science is done or how it should develop if done well; (b) to analyze three views of the human condition; and (c) to deliver a modicum of confidence and somewhat upbeat and optimistic version of the human spirit. On all three counts the programs were successful and did what they set out to do.

(a) Mode of reasoning. Professor Barnett's delivery -- as a scientist talking about science -- was calm, dispassionate and analytical. The presentation of points -- those with which he agreed and those with which he disagreed -- were given a balanced and fair exposition. The listener had the perception of a clever person trying to solve a tough problem with as minimal personal bias and vested interest as was possible. Whatever generalization the average listener made from Prof. Barnett to the rest of us was probably quite favorable.

(b) Three biological images of man. The three images roughly translated to a view through the eyes of (i) ethologists/zoologists, e.g. Lorenz, Darwin, Ekman, Morris; (ii) sociobiologists, e.g. Wilson, Dawkins, Fisher, Haldane, Symons; and (iii) learning psychologists e.g. Pavlov, Skinner, and Watson. For all three instances, the views of humanity, as translated by Barnett and translated uniformly reasonably, did paint a somewhat dour, gloomy and mechanistic picture of humans.

The ethologists/zoologists are seen to transpose too freely from animals to humans and the resulting transcription is of an unimaginative human whose behavior is made rigid and predictable via natural selection. Barnett suggests that animal behavior tells us nothing directly about "us." However, studies on animals can develop ideas about humans which can be turned into hypotheses and then tested. Barnett continues that knowledge of animal behavior has no bearing on what we -- as humans -- ought to do.

Sociobiologists and their views on humans sum genes are not treated terribly kindly. Sociobiologists are offered as being either silly or senseless and representing reborn, if better argued, Social Darwinists. One of the failings of sociobiologists, Barnett argues, is their lack of sufficient attention paid to the wider social and political ramifications of their thoughts, speculations and conclusions. Barnett brings his point home via a linkage of tapes of Hitler's speeches with some of the concepts that sociobiologists utilize. Barnett then muses on the types of people who would be sociobiologists and what they would be like. The image presented by this muse is less than flattering. Barnett sees sociobiologists as not "wicked" people just people who do "bad" science. Again--two themes are stressed, human morality and the difficulties and dangers of generalizing from animals to humans.

The program on learning-psychology reviews Pavlovian and Skinnerian models of how human behavior is molded by external stimuli. Barnett faults this image of humanity in that (i) the theories are inadequate--even for animal behavior--and (ii) social implications are not developed. Furthermore, Barnett argues that operant conditioning is reduced to "empty verbage" and is unable to address "spontaneous action." As conceived by Barnett the image of conditioned man does not include the conscious, the conscience, and morals; the omission of which he finds serious.

Rejecting these three "biological images of man" as insufficient to make sense of our condition, Barnett offers an alternative spectre. He sees us as quite distinct from non-humans with the distinction nested in our ability to create both grammar and self-reflection. However, he never addresses the existence or development of self-reflection or of grammar, and the careful listener is left disappointed on this one point. Why we are different and how did we get that way and what perpetuates these characteristics in us are questions that are not explored.

In a concluding and optimistic passage, Barnett asks the listener to resist the "nay-sayers" and then reminds us that we are not helpless, but that we are adaptable even though "free will" is a hard burden to bear.

Membership/Subscriptions

Membership in the Society, which includes a subscription to the newsletter, is available to those sending $10.00 (U.S.) to the Newsletter editor. The rate for students is $5.00.

Ethology and Sociobiology - Discount

Subscriptions to Ethology and Sociobiology are available at a 20% discount to ISHE members. Member rate is $33.60. You may send your check and statement of ISHE membership to: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc., P.O. Box 1663, Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10163.

Dues/Subscription Renewal

Please note the date on your mailing label. If it is '83, you have not yet renewed for '84. Sample issues of the Newsletter are available at no charge to prospective members.
Current Literature

BOOKS


Biopolitics and Gender. M. W. Watts

Biography. Gender and Politics - an Assessment and Critique. D. L. Baer, B. A. Bositis


The Biopolitics of Sex - Gender, Genetics, and Epigenetics. G. Schubert

Sex. Endocrines, and Political Behavior. D. Jaros, E. S. White

Power Structures and Perceptions of Power Holders in Same-Sex Groups of Young Children. D. C. Jones

Explaining Male Chauvinism and Feminism - Cultural Differences in Male and Female Reproductive Strategies. R. D. Masters


ARTICLES, CHAPTERS


On Officers for the Society
Of those persons responding to the Newsletter survey on officers for the Society, 13 supported the proposal to elect officers and two opposed it. Michael McGuire, Chair of the Long Term Planning Committee, has volunteered to write a letter to the current Board members detailing suggestions. Among them will probably be that the Board nominate officers, then draft proposed by-laws during their first year. I suggest that the details be sorted out at the Cheney meeting, and that we get on with it.

Future Meetings
The date and location have not been selected for the 1985 meeting. One possibility is to again join the Animal Behavior Society in June at North Carolina State University, Raleigh. Another is to meet with the American Society of Primatologists.

Please send your suggestions for 1985 and subsequent meetings to Ron Weigel, Human Ethology Laboratory, Neuropsychiatric Institute, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

Contributions of the Newsletter
All items of interest to human ethologists are welcomed. Book reviews should be sent to Bill McGrew or Ian Vine. Items for Current Literature, news items, forum topics, etc., should be sent to the editor. Other items such as sabbatical and exchange possibilities and brief descriptions of ongoing research would be particularly interesting and helpful. Submissions should be typed and legible, but need not be camera-ready. Suggestions to the editor are always in order.

Human Ethology Abstracts VI
Esther Thelen will be the editor of Human Ethology Abstracts VI. Please send her any papers you would like included, particularly unpublished work that may not be widely available. If the manuscript does not contain an abstract, your writing one would be very helpful. She would also welcome suggestions regarding sources of literature, format and organization of the abstracts, etc. Her address is: Department of Psychology, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211.

Human Ethology Abstracts V: Available
The fifth edition of Human Ethology Abstracts, by Wade Mackey, is available. The abstracts, a complete issue of Man-Environment Systems is available to non-subscribers. Send a check for $3.00 for HEA V or $17.50 for all five editions, postpaid, to: The Association for the Study of Man-Environment Relations (ASMER), P.O. Box 57, Orangeburg, NY 10962.

Society Yell!!?
Michael McGuire submits the following proposed Society yell:
Give me a D! Give me a W!
Give me a D! Give me a W, I, N!
Give me a D, A, R! D-A-R-W-I-N!
(pause for breath) WIN WITH DARWIN!
Give me a W! ISHE - HOORAY!

The deadline for additional submissions is August 1. This is also the closing date for nominations for the Society's official hand-shake.

December Forum Topic:
Ian Vine has agreed to coordinate a Forum for the December issue on "Defining 'Human Nature'." Please send him your opinions, data, statements, sufficiently early to allow for correspondence. His address is: Interdisciplinary Human Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 1DP, England.

European Sociobiological Society Meeting
This ESS will meet in Oxford, U.K., in December. The theme will be "in-groups and out-groups" - the biological basis of xenophobia, nationalism, racism, etc. Further details should be available later.